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Excessive Delegation of Power to the Convening Authority of Military Commissions in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and its Implications on Public Policy 
Eric K. Miller 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The military commissions system in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has been an object of 
domestic and international criticism since its inception.
1
  The Supreme Court in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld struck down the initial military commissions established by President George W. Bush 
because the commissions violated Article 36, Uniform Code of Military Justice (USMJ) and 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
2
  Congress passed the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 (“2006 MCA”) in response to Hamdan to provide the statutory authority for military 
commissions in Guantanamo.  The 2006 MCA was amended by the Military Commissions Act 
of 2009
3
 (“MCA of 2009” or “the Act”), which authorizes the President to establish military 
commissions to try alien unprivileged enemy belligerents for violations of the law of war and 
other offenses provided in the Act.
4
  The Act further provides that the “Secretary of Defense or 
any officer or official designated by the Secretary” may convene a military commission 
authorized by the President.
5
  The Act grants the convening authority a tremendous amount 
influence over the commissions and removes from the President and Secretary of Defense the 
power to review certain decisions of the convening authority.
6
     
 Despite the vast power of the convening authority, there is little jurisprudence concerning 
the constitutionality of the office.  The absence of such jurisprudence became apparent in the 
summer of 2012 during the military commission of Abd al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Abdu al-
                                                            
1 See Lt. Col. David J. R. Frakt, Military Justice Edition:  The Practice of Criminal Law in the Guantanamo Military 
Commissions, 67 A.F. L. Rev. 35, 37 (2011). 
2 See 548 U.S. 557 (2006).   
3 10 U.S.C. §§ 948 et seq., Pub. L. 111 -84, 123 Stat. 2574 (Oct. 28, 2009). 
4 10 U.S.C. §§ 948b(a) and (b). 
5 10 U.S.C. § 948h. 
6 See generally Military Commissions Act of 2009. 
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Nashiri (“Mr. Nashiri”), the alleged mastermind of the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in the Yemen 
Port of Aden on October 12, 2000.  On June 15, 2012, counsel for Mr. Nashiri filed a motion to 
dismiss the case because the creation of the Office of the Convening Authority and the 
Convening Authority’s assumption of authority violates the Appointments Clause of Article II, 
Section II, Clause II of the United States Constitution.
7
  The motion was denied, perhaps 
incorrectly, on October 4, 2012, by Judge James L. Pohl, who found the appointment of the 
Convening Authority by the Secretary of Defense to be constitutionally permissible under 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
8
 
   This note presents the argument that the appointment of and vesting of certain powers in 
the convening authority exemplifies how current Appointments Clause jurisprudence allows 
Congress to insulate from public opinion executive officers.  Part II introduces the basics of the 
military commissions system in Guantanamo and the role of the convening authority.  Part III 
discusses the legal basis of the Appointments Clause relevant to the convening authority.  Part IV 
examines Judge Pohl’s denial of Mr. Nashiri’s motion and the shortcomings of the existing legal 
framework.  Part V raises questions how the office of the convening authority draws into 
question how the doctrine of separation of powers may fail to prevent the aggrandizing of power 
in the Executive Branch.  A governmental official is only subject to the Appointments Clause if 
he or she can be classified as an Officer, as opposed to a mere employee.  The satisfaction of the 
Appointments Clause then differs depending on whether the Officer is a “principal officer” or an 
“inferior officer.”  This framework is well settled; however, the classification of the convening 
                                                            
7 Mr. Nashiri’s defense motion, Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, AE087 Motion, “Defense Motion to Dismiss 
Because the Convening Authority Assumes the Responsibilities of an Officer of the Government Without the 
Minimal Procedures Required by the Appointments Clause that Ensure Democratic Accountability,” dtd. June 15, 
2012. 
8 Ruling on Mr. Nashiri’s defense motion AE087, Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, “AE087D Ruling,’ dtd. 
October 4, 2012. 
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authority as an “inferior officer” is evidence of the deficiency in Appointments Clause 
jurisprudence and that insulating the convening authority from popular opinion, while 
constitutionally permissible, is a bad policy.   
 
II.  MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE CONVENING AUTHORITY 
 A military commission is a military court of law, and Congress has granted the President 
authority to create military commissions to hear cases against alien
9
 unprivileged enemy 
belligerents.
10
  An unprivileged enemy belligerent is defined as 
[A]n individual (other than a privileged belligerent)11 who (A) has engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners; (B) has purposefully and materially supported hostilities 
against the United States or its coalition partners; or (C) was part of al Qaeda at the time of the 
alleged offense under this chapter.12 
 
Once created, a military commission may only “be convened by the Secretary of Defense or by 
any officer or official of the United States designated by the Secretary for that purpose.”13   
The Office of the Convening Authority is one of five organizations of the Department of 
Defense tasked with administering the military commissions in Guantanamo.  The other 
organizations include the Office of the Chief Prosecutor, the Office of the Chief Defense 
Counsel, the Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, and the United States Court of Military 
Commission Review (“USCMCR”).14  For purposes of this paper, only the Office of the 
Convening Authority and the USCMCR are relevant.  The MCA of 2009 grants the USCMCR 
with jurisdiction to review findings of guilt for both factual sufficiency and sentence 
                                                            
9 “Alien" is defined as “an individual who is not a citizen of the United States.” 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1). 
10 10 U.S.C. §§ 948b(b) 948c. 
11 A “privileged belligerent” is defined as “an individual belonging to one of the eight categories enumerated in 
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.” 10 U.S.C. § 948a(6). 
12 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7). 
13 10 U.S.C. § 948h. 
14 UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMISSIONS, ORGANIZATION OVERVIEW (2012), available at 
http://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS/OrganizationOverview.aspx. 
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appropriateness.
15
  The jurisdiction “mirrors that exercised by the military service Courts of 
Criminal Appeals in review of courts-martial in which the approved sentence includes death . . . 
or confinement for one year or more, an authority characterized as an ‘awesome, plenary, de 
novo power of review.’”16 The power of the USCMCR to review decisions of the military 
commissions, however, is not without limitation.  Congress explicitly removed from the 
USCMCR jurisdiction to review any finding or sentence not approved by the convening 
authority, regardless of the reason.
17
  This limitation is problematic because it adds a procedural 
step between the finding of the commission and review by the USCMCR, which renders the 
convening authority immensely important.   
The current convening authority
18
 is retired Vice Admiral Bruce MacDonald.  
Importantly, despite being a formerly commissioned officer, Vice Adm. MacDonald officially 
occupies a civilian position in the Department of Defense’s Senior Executive Service.19  During 
the pretrial proceedings and military commission, the convening authority has the exclusive 
authority to detail members of the armed forces to serve as members of the military 
commission.
20
  The convening authority has final authority to “order that such investigative or 
other resources be made available to defense counsel and the accused as deemed necessary . . . 
for a fair trial”21 and “[r]eviews requests from the prosecution and the defense for experts and 
                                                            
15 10 U.S.C. § 950f(d). 
16 United States v. Al Bahlul, 2011 U.S. CMCR Lexis 3, 11 (Sept. 9, 2011) (citing United States v. Cole, 31 M.J. 
270, 272 (C.M.A. 1990) (in turn citing 10 U.S.C. §866)). 
17 10 U.S.C. 950f(d). 
18 Actual position is referred to as director, Office of the Convening Authority, Immediate Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Washington, D.C.  
19 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release, “Senior 
Executive Service Appointments and Reassignments,” dtd. March 30, 2010.  
http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=13418 
20 10 U.S.C. 948h. 
21 Reg. T. Mil. Comm. § 2-3(a)(10) (2011). 
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determine[s] whether the experts sought are relevant and necessary.”22  Further, the convening 
authority has final authority to detail interpreters for the military commission, defense counsel, 
and for the accused.
23
   
The convening authority has extensive authority after the trial produces a verdict and 
sentence.  Perhaps the greatest power possessed by the convening authority is his or her 
discretion in review the commission’s verdict and sentence.  The MCA of 2009 provides that the 
convening authority has the “sole discretion . . . [to] approve, disapprove, commute or suspend 
the sentence in whole or in part.
24
  The authority to modify the findings of guilt or sentence of 
the accused “is a matter of the sole discretion and prerogative of the convening authority.”25  The 
convening authority may also “[d]ismiss any charge or specification by setting aside a finding of 
guilty thereto.”26   
The convening authority’s exclusive authority to dismiss any charge or disapprove of a 
finding of guilt is significant because Congress only provides appellate review before the United 
States Court of Military Commission Review (“USCMCR”) for findings of guilt approved by the 
convening authority.
27
  Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit is vested with the “exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a final 
judgment rendered by a military commission” and approved by the convening authority and, 
where applicable, the UCSMCR.
28
  Therefore, the convening authority can unilaterally end the 
judicial proceedings for the accused by suspending the sentence in whole or by dismissing the 
charges by setting aside a guilty verdict.   
                                                            
22 Id. at § 2-3(a)(11). 
23 10 U.S.C. § 948l(b).  
24 Reg. T. Mil. Comm. § 23-7 (2011); see also 10 U.S.C. § 950b(c)(3)(C). 
25 10 U.S.C. § 950b(c)(1). 
26 10 U.S.C. § 950(c)(2)(A). 
27 10 U.S.C. § 950c. 
28 10 U.S.C. § 950g(a). 
Page 6 
III.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK:  THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND THE MORRISON 
FACTORS 
The seminal case for Appointments Clause jurisprudence is Morrison v. Olson.
29
  In 
Morrison, the Court articulated, inter alia, the legal framework for determining whether the 
particular officer in question must be nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate.  
A government official is only subject to the Appointments Clause
30
 if he or she is an officer, as 
opposed to an employee.   “[A]ny appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws 
of the United States is an Officer of the United States, and must, therefore, be appointed by in the 
manner prescribed by [the Appointments Clause].”31  For purposes of the Appointments Clause, 
the Constitution divides all officers into two classes.
32
  Thus, the first step is to determine 
whether the officer is an “inferior” or a “principal” officer.33  The line between the types of 
officers is “far from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be 
drawn.”34    
In Morrison, the Court addressed the distinction between inferior and principal officers.  
The issue before the Court was whether Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act
35
 (“the Ethics 
Act”) violated the Appointments Clause.  “Briefly stated, Title VI of the Ethics in Government 
Act . . . allows for the appointment of an ‘independent counsel’ to investigate and, if appropriate, 
                                                            
29 487 U.S. 654 (1980). 
30 “[The President] shall nominate, and, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the 
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in 
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” U.S. Cons. Art II, § 2, Cl. 2. 
31 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, at 126 (1976). 
32 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670 (1988) (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509 (1879)). 
33 Id. at 670-71. 
34 Id. at 671 (citing 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1536, pp. 397-398 (3d ed. 1858)).. 
35 28 U. S. C. §§ 591-599 (1982 ed., Supp. V). 
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prosecute certain highranking Government officials for violations of federal criminal laws.”36  
Specifically,  
The [Ethics] Act require[d] the Attorney General, upon receipt of information that he determines 
is ‘sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether any person covered by the Act may have 
violated any Federal criminal law,’ to conduct a preliminary investigation of the matter.37 
 
Upon completion of the investigation, if the Attorney General determines that no reasonable 
grounds exist to warrant further investigation, then he must notify the Special Division, a court 
created by the Act, of the fact.
38
 If no reasonable grounds exist, the Special Division has no 
power to take further action.
39
  However, if the Attorney General determines there to be 
reasonable grounds to warrant further investigation, then the Attorney General shall apply to the 
Special Division with sufficient information to the to assist the court in the appointment of 
independent counsel and in defining said counsel’s jurisdiction.40  Upon receipt of the Attorney 
General’s application, the Special Division was required to appoint independent counsel and 
define that counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction.41   
 The Court, in upholding the constitutionality of office of independent counsel, expressly 
denied the creation of a brightline rule for determining whether the officer in question is an 
inferior or a principal officer.
42
  The independent counsel, in the Court’s opinion, was so clearly 
on the side of the line rendering him an inferior officer that the Court stated it “need not attempt 
to decide exactly where the line falls between the two types of officers. . . .”43  The Court relied 
on four factors to reach this conclusion.   
                                                            
36 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988) (quotations in original) (italics in original). 
37 Id. (quotations in original) (internal brackets removed). 
38 Id. at 661. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 661. 
42 Id. at 671. 
43 Id.  
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First, the independent counsel is subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official 
in the Attorney General.
44
  Although the independent counsel possesses a degree of independent 
discretion, the fact that she can be removed by the Attorney General indicates that she is inferior 
in rank and authority.
45
  Second, the Ethics Act limited the independent counsel’s authority “to 
perform only certain, limited duties.”46  Although independent counsel had the authority to 
exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Department of Justice, independent 
counsel was not granted the authority to formulate policy for the Executive Branch nor was 
independent counsel granted “any administrative duties outside of those necessary to operate her 
office.”47     Third, the independent counsel’s office is limited in jurisdiction.48   
Not only is the [Ethics] Act itself restricted in applicability to certain federal officials suspected of 
certain serious federal crimes, but an independent counsel can only act within the scope of the 
jurisdiction that has been granted by the Special Division pursuant to a request by the Attorney 
General.49 
 
Fourth, the independent counsel’s office is limited in tenure, even though there is no particular 
time limit on the appointment, because independent counsel is appointed to accomplish a single 
task.
50
  Upon completion of the task, the office is either self-terminated or terminated by the 
Special Division.
51
  Likewise, the responsibilities of the independent counsel are terminated 
when the task at hand is completed.  In totality, “the ideas of tenure, duration [ ] and duties’ of 
the independent counsel . . . are sufficient to establish that the [independent counsel] is an 
‘inferior’ officer in the constitutional sense.”52 
  
                                                            
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671. 
47 Id.   
48 Id. at 672.   
49 Id. 
50 Id.   
51 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672. 
52 Id. (internal quotations in original) (internal citations omitted). 
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 Justice Scalia criticized the four factors relied upon by the majority because no prior legal 
authority recognized those particular factors as being determinative.
53
  Additionally, Justice 
Scalia contended that each of the four factors as applied to independent counsel should have 
resulted in a determination that she was, in fact, a principal officer.  Scalia’s view was “that the 
independent counsel is not an inferior officer because she is not subordinate to any officer in the 
Executive Branch (indeed, not even to the President).”54   
In relying on the Morrison factors, Judge James K. Pohl denied Mr. Nashiri’s motion to 
dismiss by concluding that the four factors as applied to the convening authority rendered the 
position to be one of an inferior officer.  The reliance on these factors underscores the 
inadequacy of the legal framework – as addressed by Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion – by 
highlighting how current jurisprudence on the Appointments Clause allows for the insulation of 
executive authority from public opinion. 
 
IV.  THE DENIAL OF MR. NASHIRI’S MOTION AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE 
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
 
1. Judge Pohl’s Denial of Mr. Nashiri’s Motion  
Mr. Nashiri’s motion to dismiss without prejudice the charges against him because the 
Convening Authority was improperly appointed was denied on October 4, 2012.
55
  Judge Pohl 
needed less than two pages to rule against Mr. Nashiri.  The Commission’s findings were three 
fold:  first, the convening authority was properly appointed by the Secretary of Defense; second, 
the convening authority is an inferior officer under the “controlling four-factor analysis” of 
Morrison v. Olson; and third, the convening authority properly exercised his authority to 
                                                            
53 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
54 Id. (italics in original) (parentheses in original). 
55 Ruling on Mr. Nashiri’s defense motion AE087, Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, “AE087D Ruling,’ dtd. 
October 4, 2012, pg. 1. 
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convene the military commission.
56
  The most important of these determinations is the finding of 
the convening authority to be an inferior officer under Morrison.   
 The first mishap in Judge Pohl’s decision is the classification of Morrison’s four-factor 
analysis as being “controlling.”57  The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the four factors 
addressed in Morrison were specific to that case and are not the only factors worthy of 
consideration when the circumstances are different.
58
  Nevertheless, Judge Pohl’s application of 
Morrison warrants further exploration.  Applying the four-factor analysis, Judge Pohl made the 
following findings in reaching the conclusion that the convening authority is an inferior officer: 
(1) The Convening Authority is subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch 
official; namely, the Secretary of Defense. 
(2) The Convening Authority is empowered to perform only certain, limited 
duties.  His authority extends only to cases charged by the prosecutor and 
nominated for trial by military commission.  He enjoys no power to make 
Department of Defense policy or to prescribe Departmental administration 
beyond that necessary to effect the functioning of his office. 
(3) The Convening Authority’s office is limited in jurisdiction.  He is limited by 
statute to a narrowly defined set of duties pertaining exclusively to the 
convening of military commissions. 
(4) The Convening Authority’s office is limited in tenure.  His tenure extends 
only to the completion of the cases nominated for trial by military 
commission.
59
   
Each of these findings will be addressed in turn to demonstrate how the rigid application of 
Morrison is inappropriate and, where appropriate, how the consideration of certain powers 
granted to the convening authority should result in a contrary finding.   
a. Subject to Removal by a Higher Office 
The first factor in Morrison is that an officer is “inferior” if he or she is subject to 
removal by a higher Executive Branch officer.  The flaws with using this criterion are twofold.  
                                                            
56 Id. at pages 1-2.   
57 Id. at p. 1.   
58 See Edmonds v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997). 
59 Ruling on Mr. Nashiri’s motion, pg. 2. 
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First, as Justice Scalia argued in his dissenting opinion in Morrison, a good cause limitation on 
the removal of an Officer necessarily removes from the President the ability to effectively 
control the Executive Branch.
60
  If the independent counsel were removable at the Attorney 
General’s will, as is the Attorney General to the President’s will, then independent counsel 
would be inferior.
61
  However, Congress’ requirement that independent counsel only be removed 
with good cause explicitly makes independent counsel not subordinate.
62
  Second, if being 
subject to removal for good cause renders one inferior, then it could be said that Congress’ 
impeachment power of the President renders the President inferior.
63
  Thus, focusing the inquiry 
on whether Congress allows for removal of the officer in question obfuscates the issue.  Simply 
because one is removable does not mean that one is inferior, especially when one only becomes 
removable after failing to effectively perform his or her duties.     
Like the independent counsel in Morrison, the convening authority for military 
commissions is vested with exclusive authority to perform certain tasks.  Particularly 
problematic is the convening authority’s sole discretion to approve or disapprove of charges 
brought against a defendant.  The convening authority can, without fear of reprimand, dismiss 
any and all charges against an accused following a trial and verdict.  Neither the President or the 
Secretary of Defense have any influence on this particular decision, and Congress has not 
provided the statutory authority for the President or Secretary of Defense to revisit what either of 
them to believe is an erroneous or malicious dismissal.  Moreover, Congress provided the 
USCMCR jurisdiction to hear only cases where the findings of guilt and sentences were 
approved by the convening authority.  Therefore, the convening authority has the sole power to 
                                                            
60 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
61 Id. 
62 Id.   
63 Id. 
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dismiss an effective prosecution of an accused, thereby rendering the President unable to ensure 
the laws are faithfully executed.     
b. Empowered to Perform only Certain, Limited Duties 
The second factor in Morrison is that an officer is “inferior” if he or she is empowered to 
perform only certain, limited duties.  The finding of the independent counsel to be an inferior 
officer was in spite of the fact that Congress vested the office with all the investigative and 
prosecutorial functions of the Department of Justice.  Nevertheless, the inability of independent 
counsel to formulate policy or exercise administrative duties outside of those necessary to 
perform her statutory duties rendered her an inferior officer.  Admittedly, restricting an officer to 
the performance of only certain, limited duties may be a relevant to determining whether he or 
she in an inferior officer.
64
  However, the focus should be on the qualitative authority to perform 
those certain, limited duties – not the quantitative number of duties to be performed.65  For 
Justice Scalia, the fact that the independent counsel had the “full power and independent 
authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department 
of Justice” was sufficient to recognize independent counsel as a principal officer.66  Additionally, 
the inability of independent counsel to formulate policy “could be said for all officers of the 
Government, with the single exception of the President.”67   
 Similarly, the convening authority only performs certain, limited duties and does not have 
the power to formulate government policy.  However, once appointed by the Secretary of 
Defense, the convening authority is vested with certain powers that the Secretary of Defense 
does not have.  Namely, the convening authority micromanages the resources available to 
                                                            
64 Morrison, 487 U.S. 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
65 See id. at 716-17. 
66 Id. at 717. 
67 Id. 
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counsel during the military commission.  Likewise, the convening authority’s power to dismiss 
charges against an accused and end the military commission may be limited in scope, but it is 
nonetheless a grant of authority possessed by neither the President nor Secretary of Defense.   
c. Limited Nature of the Jurisdiction and Tenure 
The third and fourth factors in Morrison are the jurisdiction and tenure of an officer.  The 
Morrison Court found independent counsel was an inferior officer because her tenure was 
limited to the completion of a particular task as dictated by the Special Division.  Further, the 
Court found independent counsel to be an inferior officer because her investigative and 
prosecutorial jurisdiction was limited by the Special Division.  The Court’s reliance on these 
factors is improper because it obfuscates the importance of the office.  First, the independent 
counsel “ha[d] already served more than two years, which is at least as long as many Cabinet 
officials.”68  Cabinet officials, who serve four year terms, are also limited in tenure, though it is 
widely understood that such officers are Principal Officers.  Second, although independent 
counsel’s jurisdiction is limited, her authority to act within her jurisdiction exceeds the grant of 
authority to the Attorney General.
69
  Although jurisdiction may limit when an officer may 
exercise authority, jurisdictional limitations do not restrict the exercise of authority within the 
jurisdiction.  For example, “The Ambassador to Luxembourg is not anything less than a principal 
officer, simply because Luxembourg is small.  And the federal judge who sits in a small district 
is not for that reason “inferior in rank and authority.”70  Therefore, by looking at whether 
Congress has limited jurisdiction of a particular officer is improper if the officer nevertheless 
exercises power that would render the officer a principal officer.   
                                                            
68 Id. at 718. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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Here, the convening authority is limited in both jurisdiction and tenure and, thus, was 
held to be an “Inferior” officer by Judge Pohl.  Interestingly, however, the tenure of the 
convening authority is limited to the completion of cases nominated for trial by military 
commission.  This is problematic because there may always be a case awaiting trial by military 
commission.  The MCA of 2009 explicitly allows for charges to be brought against any 
unprivileged enemy belligerent.
71
  Therefore, the convening authority occupies a potentially 
permanent office.  Similarly, the jurisdiction of the convening authority, though limited to the 
oversight of military commissions, is downplayed by Judge Pohl.  The quantitative number of 
decisions the convening authority is authorized to make is not a proper measurement of his status 
as an inferior officer.  Rather, the fact that the convening authority’s jurisdiction affords him 
unreviewable discretion is significant.  Congress’ granting of jurisdiction to the convening 
authority to disapprove of a finding of guilt, especially in the absence of factors guiding the 
convening authority’s decision, renders the convening authority the final decision maker.  
Essentially, the grant of authority to the convening authority functions as a removal of 
jurisdiction from the President and Secretary of Defense.     
Assuming the four-factors of Morrison to be controlling, it is understandable how Judge 
Pohl reached the conclusion that the convening authority is an inferior officer.  That is not to say, 
however, that such a decision is correct.  The four-factors identified in Morrison were specific to 
that particular case because the determination of officer status is a case by case inquiry.
72
  
However, Judge Pohl’s decision is void of specific factual references.  As shown, the application 
of Morrison could result in a different determination of the convening authority’s officer status.  
Nevertheless, the discussion of how Morrison does not necessarily support a clear finding of the 
                                                            
71 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 948b and 948q.   
72 See Edmonds, 520 U.S. at 661. 
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convening authority being either an “Inferior” or “Principal” officer is demonstrative of the 
shortcomings of jurisprudence on the subject. 
2. The Alternative Approach under Edmonds and its Inherent Flaws 
a. The Edmonds Decision 
The Court’s decision in Edmonds v. United States73 is instructive because the Court 
addressed a materially different situation in which the Morrison factors were not applicable. The 
Edmonds decision exemplifies the inherent problem with the legal framework currently used to 
determine the line between inferior and principal officers.  At issue in Edmonds was whether 
judges of military Courts of Criminal Appeals are principal or inferior officers within the 
meaning of the Appointments Clause.
74
  The Court recognized that “cases have not set forth an 
exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appointment 
Clause purposes.”75  Nevertheless, the Court again declined to establish a bright-line rule and 
added to the confusion of what constitutes a principal or inferior officer.       
In referencing Morrison’s four factor inquiry, the Court in Edmonds acknowledged that 
the tenure and jurisdiction of military judges are not limited, unlike the tenure and jurisdiction of 
independent counsel at issue in Morrison.
76
  Further, the Court in Edmonds recognized military 
judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals exercise “significant authority” in reviewing courts 
martial proceedings that result in the most serious sentences and ensure that a court martial’s 
findings of guilt and sentencing is correct in law and fact.
77
  Nevertheless, the Court concluded 
that military judges are inferior officers.   
                                                            
73 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 
74 Id. at 655-56. 
75 Id. at 661. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 662. 
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[I]n the context of a clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to 
important government assignments, we think it evident that “inferior officers” are 
officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were 
appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.
78
 
 
The military judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals are supervised by Judge Advocate General 
of the Coast Guard, who is subordinate to the secretary of Transportation, and the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces.
79
 
 The degree of supervision over military judges is highly relevant.  The Judge Advocate 
General is able to prescribe uniform rules of procedure for the court and must formulate policies 
and procedure for review of court-martial cases.
80
   The Judge Advocate General may also 
remove a judge from the Court of Criminal Appeals without cause.
81
  However, the Judge 
Advocate General may not “attempt to influence (by threat of removal or otherwise) the outcome 
of individual proceedings”82 and may not reverse a decision of the court.83  Rather, the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces “reviews every decision of the Courts of Criminal Appeals in 
which: (a) the sentence extends to death; (b) the Judge Advocate General orders such review; or 
(c) the court itself grants review upon petition of the accused.”84  In concluding that military 
judges are inferior officers, the Court in Edmonds stated that “[w]hat is significant is that the 
judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the 
United States unless permitted to do so by other executive officers.”85   
 
 
                                                            
78 Id. at 663 (emphasis added). 
79 Id. at 664. 
80 Id. (citing Art. 66(f), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §866(f)). 
81 Id.  
82 Id. (citing Art. 37, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §837). 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 664-65 (citing Art. 67(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §867(a)). 
85 Id. at 665.   
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b. The Flaw of Edmonds 
Regardless of Judge Pohl’s over-reliance on Morrison, he would have likely reached the 
same conclusion that the convening authority is an inferior officer under Edmonds.  The 
Edmonds inquiry of whether an officer is supervised at “some level” by a principal officer would 
have been satisfied because the Secretary of Defense does, in fact, supervise the convening 
authority at some level.  Thus, there is a distinction to be drawn between Morrison and Edmonds.  
While Morrison emphasized a formalistic approach that identified four objective factors to 
determine that independent counsel was an inferior officer, Edmonds adopted a more functional 
approach that focused on the functional relationship between judges of military Courts of 
Criminal Appeals and the Attorney General to conclude that the degree of supervision exercised 
by the Attorney General, a principal officer, renders the judges inferior officers.  The functional 
approach of Edmonds can be lauded for its emphasis on actual decision-making authority, a 
factor that Morrison obfuscated. 
However, the functional inquiry of Edmonds has the potential to render an officer inferior 
based solely on his or her being supervised at “some level,” regardless of actual authority.86  As a 
result, both Morrison and Edmonds allow officers of the United States who have final decision-
making power of on behalf of the Executive Branch to be insulated from public opinion.  The 
resulting problem is that Congress can create an office within the Executive Branch and vest him 
or her with the executive power to oversee the execution of laws while removing from the 
President the ability to reprimand him or her for certain decisions made in fulfilling the duties of 
the office.     
   
                                                            
86 See id.at 651. 
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V.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL INSULATION OF THE CONVENING 
AUTHORITY FROM PUBLIC OPINION 
 Categorizing the convening authority as an inferior officer means that the current 
appointment procedure satisfies the Appointments Clause.  Satisfying this constitutional 
requirement, however, leads to two areas of concern.  First, the aggrandizing of executive power 
in the hands of the convening authority raises questions of how the doctrine of Separation of 
Powers works to prevent intra-department distribution of authority.  Second, the convening 
authority’s ability to dismiss charges after a finding of guilt jeopardizes the rights of the accused.        
1. The Doctrine of Separation of Powers is Intended to Ensure that the 
President can Faithfully see that the Laws are Executed 
The doctrine of separation of powers is among the most fundamental principles upon 
which the Constitution is based.  “The leading Framers of our Constitution viewed the principle 
of separation of powers as the central guarantee of a just government.
87
  Even recently, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the doctrine.  “The growth of the Executive 
Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life, heightens 
the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.”88     
Of particular relevance is the unique risk military commissions pose to the separation of 
powers.   
Trial by military commission raises separation-of-powers concerns of the highest 
order.  Located within a single branch, these courts carry the risk that offenses 
will be defined, prosecuted, and adjudicated by executive officials without 
independent review.  Concentration of power puts personal liberty in peril of 
arbitrary action by officials, an incursion the Constitution’s three-part system is 
designed to avoid.  It is imperative, then, that when military tribunals are 
established, full and proper authority exists for the Presidential directive.
89
 
 
                                                            
87 Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 870 (1991). 
88 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010) (hereinafter 
“PCAOB”). 
89 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Although the Court in Hamdan focused its separation of powers inquiry on whether the President 
was Congressionally authorized to establish the military commissions created to try Hamdan, a 
different separation of powers issue exists with regards to the convening authority; namely, 
whether the vesting of executive power in the convening authority impermissibly removes from 
the President the ability to faithfully see that the laws are executed.  Even in legislative acts 
where Congress does not aggrandize power to itself, “it must refrain from impairing the 
performance of the Executive Branch.”90    
   The Constitution provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America.”91  It has long been settled that this vesting of executive power 
includes the power to remove executive officers.
92
  The President’s ultimate authority to ensure 
the laws are faithfully executed is critical because “[w]ithout a clear and effective chain of 
command, the public cannot ‘determine on whom the blame of punishment of a pernicious 
measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall.’”93  Thus, a Congressional act that 
eliminates the President’s oversight of executive decisions violates the separation of powers.94    
The Court reaffirmed the President’s inherent power to remove executive officers in 
Myers v. United States.
95
   Subsequently, the Court clarified its holding in Myers, stating 
Congress may impose good-cause restrictions on the removal of principal officers of independent 
agencies that have either quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial in nature.
96
  
In Morrison v. Olson, the Court also addressed whether the Ethics in Government Act of 
1978 violated the principle of separation of powers by “unduly interfering with the role of the 
                                                            
90 PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at 3156 (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986)). 
91 U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
92 PCAOB, at 3152 (citing Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230 (1839)). 
93 Id. at 3155 (citing The Federalist No. 70, at 476 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)). 
94 Id.  
95 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
96 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-29 (1935) 
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Executive Branch.”97  The Court, rejecting the constitutional challenge, provided three 
justifications for its holding.  First, the Act was not “an attempt by Congress to increase its own 
powers at the expense of the Executive Branch.
98
   No particular congressperson was empowered 
by the Act, and the Attorney General had no obligation to conduct an investigation..  Second, the 
Court found that the Act did not work “any judicial usurpation of properly executive functions” 
because the Special Division lacked the power to appoint an independent counsel sua sponte and 
did not retain any supervisory authority following an appointment.
99
   Third, the Court did not 
find the Act to “impermissibly undermine[] the powers of the Executive Branch . . . or disrupt[] 
the proper balance between the coordinate branches by preventing the Executive Branch from 
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”100  The reason for this final determination 
is that the Act, though conferring unto the Independent Counsel some independence from the 
Executive Branch, provided the Attorney General a means of controlling the prosecutorial 
powers of the counsel.
101
   
Most importantly, the Attorney General retains the power to remove the counsel for "good cause," 
a power that we have already concluded provides the Executive with substantial ability to ensure 
that the laws are "faithfully executed" by an independent counsel. No independent counsel may be 
appointed without a specific request by the Attorney General, and the Attorney General's decision 
not to request appointment if he finds "no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation 
is warranted" is committed to his unreviewable discretion.  The Act thus gives the Executive a 
degree of control over the power to initiate an investigation by the independent counsel. In 
addition, the jurisdiction of the independent counsel is defined with reference to the facts 
submitted by the Attorney General, and once a counsel is appointed, the Act requires that the 
counsel abide by Justice Department policy unless it is not "possible" to do so. 
 
Id.  Thus, the Executive Branch partial retention of control over the independent counsel 
rendered the President able to perform his constitutional obligations. Id.        
                                                            
97 487 U.S. at 693.   
98 Id. at 694. 
99 Id. at 695 (italics in original). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 696. 
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Recently, in 2010, the Court once again considered the ability of Congress to limit the 
removal power of the President.
102
   The issue before the Court was whether Congress may 
restrict the President’s ability “to remove a principal officer, who is in turn restricted in his 
ability to remove an inferior officer, even though that inferior officer . . . enforces the laws of the 
United States.”103  Neither removal restriction, standing alone, was alleged to be 
unconstitutional.
104
   Rather, the question presented was whether the separate layers of protection 
may be combined.
105
   The Court held that such multilevel protection “is contrary to Article II’s 
vesting of the executive power in the President.”106   By insulating the President from the 
conduct of inferior officers, Congress removed from the President the ability to “ensure that the 
laws are faithfully executed.”107   
In PCAOB, Respondent Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“Board”) was 
created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
108
  The Board, consisting of five members appointed 
by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), was tasked with regulating accounting firms that 
audit public companies under the securities law.  The SEC could not remove the Board members 
except for good cause in accordance with certain procedures.
109
 The President could not object to 
the Commissioner’s finding of good cause unless the Commissioner’s determination was “so 
unreasonable as to constitute ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’”  This 
double layer of protection is problematic because “[n]either the President, nor anyone directly 
responsible to him, nor even an officer whose conduct he may review only for good cause, has 
                                                            
102 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138, (2010) (hereinafter 
“PCAOB”). 
103 Id. at 3147.  
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 PCAOB, 130 S. Ct at 3147. 
108 Id. at 3142. 
109 Id.. (quoting Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 620). 
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full control of the Board.”110  The restriction on the President’s removal power rendered him 
unable to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed in violation of Article II.
111
  In curing the 
constitutional defect, the Court held invalid the removal restrictions limiting the Commission’s 
power to remove the Board members.  Therefore, “the President [was] separated from Board 
members by only a single level of good-cause tenure” rendering the Commission “fully 
responsible for the Board’s actions, which are no less subject that the Commission’s own 
functions to Presidential oversight.”112 
Thus, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court establishes a few brightline rules for 
limiting the power of the President to oversee Executive officers.  First, although the President’s 
Executive power inherently includes the power to remove executive officers
113
, Congress may 
limit the President’s power to remove principal officers.114  Second, Congress may not limit the 
President’s power to remove officers by imposing good-cause limitations on the President’s 
power to remove principal officers who are in turn restricted in removing inferior officers except 
for good cause.
115
  The latter of these rules is relevant for understanding the significance of the 
convening authority’s decision making authority.  Although Congress has not imposed 
limitations on the President’s ability to remove the Secretary of Defense, Congress has removed 
from the Secretary of Defense the authority to remove the convening authority in certain 
circumstances.  Unlike a good cause requirement where a showing of malfeasance can justify the 
removal of an inferior officer, the convening authority enjoys unfettered discretion to make 
certain determinations without fear of reprisal. 
                                                            
110 Id. at 3154. 
111 Id. 
112 PCAOB, at 3161. 
113 Myers, 272 U.S. 52. 
114 Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 627-29. 
115 PCAOB, at 3154.  
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2. The President has no Authority to Remove a Convening Authority for 
Improperly Dismissing Charges against an Accused 
The MCA of 2009 does not provide any particular level of cause necessary for the 
Secretary of Defense to remove the convening authority.  Even if there were a good cause 
limitation imposed upon the Secretary of Defense’s removal power, such a limitation, alone, 
would not be unconstitutional.
116
   The Act does, however, vest the convening authority with the 
sole discretion make certain decisions that are unreviewable regardless of the merit of such 
decision.
117
  Additionally, the MCA of 2009 expressly forbids unlawful influence of the 
convening authority.  The Act provides, “No person may attempt to coerce or, by any 
unauthorized means, influence . . . the action of any convening. . . . authority with respect to their 
judicial acts.”118  Unlike a good cause provision limiting the removal power of the President or a 
principal officer of an inferior officer, which allows for removal in dereliction of duty, Congress 
appears to have removed from the President or Secretary of Defense any ability to remove the 
convening authority for dismissing a charge, for whatever reason, against an accused, even if the 
accused is found guilty by a military commission.
119
   
Whether political pressures from the President or Secretary of Defense to dismiss a 
particular charge or affirm a finding of guilt constitutes unlawful command influence on the 
convening authority is critical.  If, by virtue of the MCA of 2009, the convening authority shall 
have the sole discretion to approve a finding of guilt or dismiss a particular charge, then it is 
reasonable to assume that any political pressures that influence the convening authority’s 
decisions are, in fact, prohibited by the Act.  Unfortunately, the military commissions are 
                                                            
116 See PCAOB, at 3161. 
117 See 10 U.S.C. § 950b(c)(2). 
118 10 U.S.C. § 949b(a)(2)(B). 
119 10 U.S.C. § 950b(c)(2). 
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inherently ripe with political influences.  Lieutenant Colonel David J. R. Frakt
120
 detailed the 
role that political connections play in the military commission process. 
The atmosphere surrounding military commission cases is highly politically charged.  Decisions to 
hold or release a detainee, to prosecute or not to prosecute, and to provide a favorable plea bargain 
are not are influenced by a wide variety of diplomatic and political factors which may have little to 
do with the merits of the case.121 
Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that the convening authority, despite having the sole 
discretion to dismiss a charge or approve a finding of guilt, will make such a decision in light of 
competing political interests.  Neither the Secretary of Defense nor President can influence the 
decision.     
3. Vesting the Convening Authority with the Sole Decisionmaking Power 
to Dismiss an Accused’s Case could lead to the Continued Indefinite 
Detention for the Accused 
Regardless of the constitutionality of the MCA of 2009, the convening authority 
possesses the power to remove from the accused an opportunity for a decision on the merits of 
the case.  Although the dismissal of an accused’s case after a finding of guilt may initially seem 
like a layer of protection in favor of the accused, such authority may actually work against the 
best interests of the detainee.  Once dismissed, the detainee would be sent back to detention, 
which could be highly problematic.  Under the law of war detention, “no criminal charges need 
to be established” to justify the indefinite detention.122  As such, a criminal conviction and the 
serving of a sentence may be the only way certain detainees will be freed from Guantanamo prior 
to the end of the conflict.     
The language of the MCA of 2009 does not indicate that the dismissal of a charge is the 
equivalent of entering a finding of “not guilty.”  Rather, the plain language of the MCA suggests 
                                                            
120 Former Lead Defense Counsel, Office of the Chief Defense Counsel, Office of Military Commissions, from 
August 2008 to august 2009. 
121 Lt. Col. David J.R. Frakt, MILITARY JUSTICE EDITION: THE PRACTICE OF CRIMINAL LAW IN THE GUANTANAMO 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS, 67 A.F. L. Rev. 35, 50-51 (2011). 
122 David S. Dris, “Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool,” 5 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 1, 59 (2011). 
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a dismissal simply places the accused in the same position he or she was before the trial – an 
accused unprivileged enemy belligerent.
123
  As an accused enemy belligerent, a detainee can be 
detained indefinitely.  Though detainees have a right to habeas
124
, there is neither case law nor a 
positive statutory right that confers unto a detainee the right to be charged with a crime.  Thus, 
the dismissal of a case may be a dramatic step backward in affording a detainee an opportunity to 
serve an appropriate sentence.   
The MCA of 2009 does not prescribe a statute of limitations for charging alien 
unprivileged enemy belligerents for violations of the law of war and other offenses provided in 
the Act.
125
  Further, the Act applies to offenses committed “before, on, or after September 11, 
2001.”126  Consequently, a detainee can be held indefinitely --  with no right to be charged and 
no time frame to force the government to charge him.  Mr. Nashiri, for example, has been 
accused of crimes committed in 1996.
127
  The convening authority could dismiss Mr. Nashiri’s 
case after the military commission returns a verdict.  A dismissal of the charges automatically 
removes from the USCMCR any jurisdiction to hear the case.
128
  Mr. Nashiri would have no 
recourse.     
In some instances, it may be in the best interest of an accused to have his case dismissed.  
An unfavorable sentence following a finding of guilt could result in life in prison or capital 
punishment.
129
  On the other hand, a finding of guilt could also result in a short sentence.  
Although the MCA removes from the convening authority the authority to make a sentence 
longer, the convening authority could nevertheless dismiss a charge because the sentence was not 
                                                            
123 See 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7). 
124 See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
125 10 U.S.C. § 948d(a). 
126 Id. 
127 Charge Sheet, Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Abdu Al-Nashiri, United States v. Al-Nashiri (Military 
Comm’n, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba June 30, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/nashirichargesheet.pdf. 
128 10 U.S.C. § 950f(d). 
129 10 U.S.C. § 948d. 
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agreeable.
130
  Surely, Congress intended for the convening authority to exercise his 
decisionmaking power to ensure that a sentence was not overly harsh,
131
 but the authority that 
prevents an overly harsh sentence also allows for the dismissal of a case in which the convening 
authority believes the sentence is too lenient.  A detainee who is thus sentenced to a few years of 
confinement may ultimately be detained for far longer if the charges are dismissed.  Whether 
double jeopardy would be a potential hurdle for the government’s re-prosecution of the accused 
remains to be seen.  But one can speculate that if the finding of a commission is not finalized 
until the convening authority approves it, then the dismissal of charges by the convening 
authority is not the equivalent to a decision on the merits.  As such, double jeopardy presumably 
would not be an issue.
132
   
 It is entirely possible that a convening authority may never dismiss a case following a 
finding of guilt or otherwise abuse the unreviewable power of the office.  It is also possible that 
the MCA of 2009 does not violate either the Appointments Clause or the Separation of Powers.  
However, traditional constraints on authority are not designed to prevent a particular person from 
accumulating or being improperly removed of authority – rather, the limitations are to protect the 
office itself.
133
  The validity of granting excessive authority to a particular inferior officer or 
removing certain authority from the President should not depend on whether the Executive 
Branch approves of the legislation because successors to each respective office may use the 
authority in a manner not previously used or intended by Congress.
134
  Likewise, the vesting of 
powerful executive authority in lower officials “cannot be permitted to turn on . . . whether an 
                                                            
130 10 U.S.C. § 950b(c)(2). 
131 See id. 
132 See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970) (explaining the Fifth Amendment protection against double 
jeopardy includes protections against collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, when an issue of ultimate fact has been 
determined by a final and valid judgment). 
133 See PCAOB, at 3155. 
134 Id.   
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officer exercising executive power is on good terms with Congress.
135
  Thus, the convening 
authority’s unchecked discretion to affect the legal status of an accused, while intended by 
Congress to prevent excessive punishments, may result in unintended and indefinite 
consequences.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 The Military Commissions Act of 2009 will continue to put the United States system of 
military justice in the spotlight for years to come.  Not only does the system attract the attention 
of the international community, but it also presents new questions never before addressed by the 
legal community.  The novelty of the military commissions system, combined with the minimal 
jurisprudence by which the commissions can follow, compound the difficulties faced by defense 
counsel in adequately representing the accused. 
 Although the MCA of 2009 may be constitutional, the vesting of unprecedented authority 
in the convening authority raises questions of how the current legal framework can be used to 
restrain the growth of executive power.  The Appointments Clause, despite requiring a strict 
procedural process to ensure political accountability for principal officers, can be subverted by 
creating minimal oversight over a particular office.  Likewise, the continued expansion of the 
Executive Branch raises questions of how well the doctrine of separation of powers prevents the 
aggrandizing of authority within a particular branch, as opposed to the infringement of one 
branch’s authority by another.   
 In short, the MCA of 2009 vests an unrestricted, politically unwise amount of 
decisionmaking power in the convening authority.  Without necessary safeguards in place, such 
as a statute of limitations and a statutory right to be charged with a crime, the convening 
authority can unilaterally throw out a guilty conviction and subject the accused to continued 
                                                            
135 Id. (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, at 730 (1986)). 
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indefinite detention.  Removing this power from the convening authority is not imperative 
because of the threat the current convening authority poses; rather, it is imperative because the 
danger is the granting of authority itself.  Subjecting the convening authority’s power to dismiss 
charges to review by the President or Secretary of Defense would restore political accountability 
because the President and Secretary will be directly responsible for the convening authority’s 
decision.  Further, allowing for Presidential oversight will allow the electorate to express through 
voting its dissatisfaction with how the convening authority chooses to exercise his or her 
authority.  The rationale behind Morrison, and most cases concerning the Appointments Clause, 
was to guarantee a clear chain of command between the President and all those who enforce the 
laws of the United States.  When the President is no longer capable of providing effective 
oversight, the general populace is unable to hold an elected official accountable for executive 
abuses of power.  Such a proposition is at odds with the American style of democratic 
government.  
